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COMIENTS
THE NEGLIGENT NOTARY PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE:
IS HIS EMPLOYER LIABLE?
The State of Nebraska, like most states, has commissioned a
remarkably large number of individuals as notaries public. How-
ever, few, if any, of them are exclusively notaries; in fact, most
are employed by some form of business enterprise. It would appear
that the relationship created by the private employment of indi-
viduals who are, in one sense, public officials, has escaped both atten-
tion and careful analysis. This article will discuss three groups of
problems inherent in such a relationship. Of primary concern is
the general nature and scope of the notary's duty. Of nearly equal
importance is the question of whether a notary should properly be
classified as a ministerial officer or as a quasi-judicial officer. Finally
attention will be given to the possible theories for holding the
negligent notary's employer liable.
On June 5, 1967, the Supreme Court of New Jersey filed its
opinion in the case of Commercial Union Insurance Company v. Burt
Thomas-Aitken Construction Company.1 This case will serve as the
focal point of the present inquiry because it is directly concerned
with the broad spectrum of problems mentioned above. Further-
more, in the three reported decisions resulting from the Commercial
Union case are found many of the relevant considerations, as well
as most of the apparently common misconceptions, in this area of
the law.
The plaintiff surety company founded its action on a general
indemnity agreement allegedly signed by several individuals and
by, the construction company itself. The agreement imposed per-
sonal liability on all signatories for any loss which might there-
after be sustained by the surety on construction bonds issued for
the company. This suit was instituted after the construction com-
pany defaulted on a project and the surety paid out $75,000 on a
bond. However, William Aitken, one of the defendants named by
Commercial Union as a signer of the agreement, denied signing and
alleged that the signature purporting to be his was in fact a forgery.
Since the signatures on the agreement were accompanied by a
completed and sealed acknowledgement, the plaintiff amended its
complaint to include as defendants Richard Kuiphoff, the notary
1 49 N.J. 389, 230 A.2d 498 (1967). Implicit in this article is an attempt
to determine how the Commercial Union case should be decided if
it were to arise in Nebraska; therefore, Nebraska decisions have been
utilized as the primary source of illustrations and examples. However,
any substantial variation between the Nebraska decisions and the
generally recognized rules in this area will be noted.
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public whose name and seal appeared on the acknowledgement, and
Prospect Park National Bank, his employer.
The depositions established that Kuiphoff had been an employee
of Prospect Park for twenty years at the time of the acknowledge-
ment and had for five years been a stockholder and assistant cashier.
Although the notary "could not recall" whether or not at the time
of his attestation he was personally acquainted with Aitken, or
even whether or not he knew him at the time the deposition was
taken, both the construction company and some of the individual
defendants on behalf of the company were customers of the bank.
When asked if one of the bank officers had requested that he
acknowledge the indemnity agreement, Kuiphoff, on the advice of
counsel, refused to answer. However, it was admitted that the bank
had paid the fees incidental to his reappointment as a notary public.
Furthermore, Kuiphoff testified that he had originally sought and
received his notarial commission on his own initiative2 because it
would be useful on the job in that he could notarize documents for
customers of the bank. It was also established that the employee-
notary attested to some thirty papers a year at the request of bank
customers without charge and as an accommodation to them. Not-
withstanding this admission, and for reasons which are not apparent,
it was stipulated by counsel for both sides that the bank had no part,
as a bank, in the transaction in question. Since the case arose on
the bank's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the depo-
sition and the amended pleadings, the question of Kuiphoff's indi-
vidual liability was not placed directly in issue.
On this state of facts, the trial court decided that, "The basic
fact is that [Kuiphoff] was not performing an act for the bank,
but as a notary public in the exercise of his official capacity."' The
trial judge was also of the opinion that there was not a sufficient
factual dispute to require a jury trial on the question of whether
Kuiphoff was a servant of the bank and ruled that, "... even if
another officer of the bank asked him to take the acknowledgement,
it would make no difference." 4 Therefore, the bank's motion was
granted and Commercial Union appealed.
2 Like most states New Jersey provides for the appointment or commis-
sioning of notaries by the Governor or the Secretary of State or by
both. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:7-1.1 (1955). See also NFB. REV. STAT. §
64-101 (Supp. 1967).
3 87 N.J. Super. 287, 291, 209 A.2d 155, 158 (1965). However, before
reaching this conclusion, the court had observed that: "The bank could
be liable where the notary public performs a duty for the bank, in
connection with a bank function and for the bank's interest." Id. at
290, 209 A.2d at 157.
4 Id. at 291, 209 A.2d at 158.
COMMENTS
The majority of the Appellate Division, Superior Court of New
Jersey, began their opinion by declaring that the only question to
be resolved was ". .. whether the alleged negligence of Kuiphoff
was committed by him while he was acting in the scope of his
employment." 5 They stated that if this question were answered
in the affirmative the bank would be liable. In reversing the decision
below and ordering a jury determination of Kuiphoff's agency
status in making the acknowledgement, the Appellate Division re-
lied upon the Restatement of Agency 6 as authority for the follow-
ing proposition which forms the basis of their opinion:
In this modern world of competitive banking, the efforts of a
bank to improve its relations with its customers would be as much
a part of the business of a bank as would be the performance of
"bank transactions." If the finder of fact concludes that when Kuip-
hoff performed his services as a notary he was actuated, in part
at least, by a purpose to improve this customer relationship, his
act likewise would be within the scope of his employment.i
Finally, the Appellate Division dismissed the true crux of Prospect
Park's defense with the bland assertion that if the requisite ele-
ments of liability according to conventional agency doctrines were
present, the bank would be liable, ". . even though his act in its
notarial character might be categorized as an official action." s
Understandably enough, the bank appealed this second determi-
nation. After reviewing the facts, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
begins their opinion with the following, rather questionable, analysis
of the distinction between Kuiphoff and the "ordinary" employee:
This situation differs, however, from the conventional one in two
respects. The first is that a notary public is a public officer and as
such exercises an authority the bank itself could not receive and
does an act the bank itself could not do. The second is that plaintiff
did not know of and hence did not rely upon a connection between
the notary and the bank.9
5 91 N.J. Super. 13, 15, 218 A.2d 892, 893 (1966).
6 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957). This section of the
Restatement defines the scope of employment by listing four tests to
be used in analyzing a particular act to determine whether or not
it was within the servant's scope of employment. The appellate divi-
sion placed almost total emphasis on subsection (c) of § 228 which
states that conduct is within the scope of employment if, "it is ac-
tuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." In their
opinion, this was the only one of the four criteria the fulfillment of
which was even questionable on the basis of the amended pleadings
and Kuiphoff's deposition.
7 91 N.J. Super. 13, 16, 218 A.2d 892, 894 (1966).
8 Id. at 16, 218 A.2d at 894.
9 49 N.J. 389, 392, 230 A.2d 498, 499 (1967).
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While it may be conceded that most employees are not "public
officers," and even that a bank could not be commissioned as a
notary, no corporate employer is capable of "doing" any physical
act. Thus their first assertion is actually diametrically opposed to
the distinction the court attempts to make; in his capacity to do an
act which his employer can not do, this notary-employee is indis-
tinguishable from any other employee. In its second contention, the
court fails to distinguish between the requisite elements for liability
in tort and those for liability in contract. It has never been seriously
contended that knowledge of the identity, or even the existence, of
a tortfeasor's employer was a prerequisite to recovery against such
employer pursuant to traditional tort principles. Furthermore, in
regard to the contractual liability of an employer, the common law
of undisclosed and partially disclosed principals would seem to sub-
stantially diminish the importance of the injured party's knowledge
concerning the agent's employer. Very simply, the injured party's
knowledge of the employer, and reliance thereon, are not prerequi-
sites to liability. 0
After briefly mentioning a variety of agency and tort principles,
the supreme court accepts an encyclopedia definition of notaries
public as public officers" before making this comment: "Thus the
issue before us cannot be resolved by easy recourse to those doc-
trines. Rather a policy decision must be made upon the equities of
this unique transaction."' 2
In determining that "the equities" favored the bank, the supreme
court principally relied upon two conclusions. First, since the plain-
tiff sought only the acknowledgement of some notary and was
wholly unaware of any connection between Kuiphoff and Prospect
Park at the time it received and relied upon the indemnity agree-
ment, the imposition of liability upon the Bank would result in an
unexpected, and apparently "inequitable," windfall for the plain-
tiff. An equally viable observation-that Prospect Park could rea-
sonably have foreseen liability of some type arising out of Kuip-
hoff's notarial activities and therefore by being held liable the
bank would in effect be "getting what they bargained for"-was
not discussed. Secondly, the court reasoned that since the notary
held a public office which the bank was not eligible to hold, and
10 The court dismisses these cases with the conclusion that the bank,
unlike an undisclosed principal, was not a real party in interest to
the transaction. This rather questionable assumption will be discussed
infra.
11 "A notary or notary public is a public officer. ... " 66 C.J.S. Notaries§ 1 (1950). This definition was adopted in New Jersey in Kip v.
Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 110 N.J.L. 178. 164 A. 253 (1933).
12 49 N.J. 389, 395, 230 A.2d 498, 500 (1967).
COMMENTS
exercised a "power" derived from the state rather than from his
employer, the bank's "interest" in this acknowledgement was not
sufficient to serve as a basis for tort liability."3 In short, it was held
that Prospect Park should not be liable because, "The bank could
not itself take an official acknowledgement or empower an employee
to do sO.' ' 14
The supreme court did not directly confront the issue which had
divided the two lower courts, that is, whether a conventional
master-servant relationship can arise between a notary and his
employer, and if so, whether it existed in this case. Instead, they
offered the following comment:
We add that the private employer of a notary public might be
liable for the notary's breach of duty if the employer participated
in that breach, as for example if the employer should ask or encour-
age the notary to act without appropriate inquiry. It may also be
that the private employer could be held if it led another to believe
that the notary was acting for it and on its credit or responsibility.
Neither of those conceivable bases of liability is suggested in the
case at hand, but the situation being novel, we reserve to plain-
tiff the right to file within 30 days of the date of our mandate an
amended complaint upon the first of those theses if plaintiff believes
it can succeed upon it.15
THE NOTARY PUBLIc's DUTY
In deference to the confusion surrounding the question of a
notary's purpose, function, and responsibility, it is necessary to
examine this area in order to comprehend the relevant issues in the
notary-employer relationship. It is stated in the only comprehen-
sive treatise on the subject of notaries and their functions 6 that,
"The object of all the laws on acknowledgements and proof is to
13 The court's reluctance to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior
stems from the following, quite typical, statement of the rationale
supporting that doctrine: "[T]he employer engages another to do the
work he would otherwise do himself, and for that reason it is just
that his economic entity absorb the full cost of the activity he is
able to expend through the employment of others." 49 N.J. 389, 394,
230 A.2d 498, 500 (1967). On the basis of this proposition, the court
asserts that the bank should not be liable for an act which the bank
itself could not perform. Apparently the appellate division's remarks
about the importance of improving customer relations were largely
disregarded by the supreme court. For a statement of the doctrine
of respondeat superior itself, see Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63
P. 572 (1901); this formulation was adopted in Emerson v. Western
Seed and Irr. Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927).
14 49 N.J. 389, 393, 230 A.2d 498, 499 (1967).
15 Id. at 395-96, 230 A.2d at 501.
16 J. 0. SxiNNER, A HANDBOOK FOR NOTARIES PUBLIC MN CO'VIMIsSIONERS
OF DEEs (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as SKINNER].
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place a protection around the deeds or other important instruments
from the point of view of the purchaser; to make it more certain
that the person named in a deed or instrument intended to transfer
the property or right; and to prevent frauds in conveyancing."' 7
In one of the earliest reported Nebraska decisions concerning no-
taries, the evidentiary or "certainty" function of the acknowledge-
ment was expressly recognized:
The function of an acknowledgement is two-fold: First, To auth-
orize the instrument to be given in evidence without further proof
of its execution. Second, To entitle it to be recorded.... [Ilt must
appear that the person executing the instrument did so volun-
tarily.18
Without examining in detail the function of the acknowledge-
ment, it is easily seen that both courts and legislatures have gen-
erally accorded substantial significance to the notarial seal in a very
practical and realistic sense. There is an abundance of cases which
result in one party suffering a substantial and totally unexpected
loss for the exclusive reason that the instrument by which he re-
ceived his right or interest was improperly acknowledged. 19 In fact,
it is not unlikely that the harsh manner in which the courts have
treated documents containing defective acknowledgements and those
relying upon them has served, at least in part, as the stimulus for
legislative action which attempts to partially abrogate the virtually
absolute necessity of strict compliance with the formalistic require-
ments of a valid attestation.20 Nonetheless, the fact remains that
the acknowledgement is still of greater importance than might be
expected in light of the procedures and practices of notaries gen-
erally. In short, "The validity of a real property transaction is fre-
quently dependent on the notary's performance of his duty."'2 1
In light of the importance of an acknowledgement, it is not sur-
prising that the Legislature has provided a remedy for those injured
by the notary's intentional misdeeds. Section 76-218, Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes, provides:
17 Id. at 172, § 153.
18 Becker v. Anderson, 11 Neb. 493, 497, 9 N.W. 640, 641 (1881). The
notion of protection mentioned by Skinner, supra note 16, is also im-
plicit in this opinion.
19 Welton v. Atkinson, 55 Neb. 674, 76 N.W. 473 (1898); Keeling v. Hoyt,
31 Neb. 453, 48 N.W. 66 (1891); Becker v. Anderson, 11 Neb. 493,
9 N.W. 640 (1881); Citizens National Bank v. Denison, 165 Ohio St.
89, 133 N.E.2d 329 (1956).
20 "No deed, mortgage, affidavit, power of attorney or other instrument
in writing shall be invalidated because of any defects in the wording
of the seal of the notary public attached thereto." NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 76-217.01 (Reissue 1966).
21 In re Walter, - Ore. -, 427 P.2d 96 (1967). See NEB. REV. STAT. §
76-216 (Reissue 1966) and cases annotated thereunder.
COMMENTS
Every officer within this state authorized to take the acknowl-
edgement.., who shall be guilty of knowingly stating an untruth,
or guilty of any malfeasance or fraudulent practice in the execu-
tion of the duties prescribed for them by law... shall upon con-
viction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor... and shall also be
liable in damages to the party injured.
A somewhat more equivocal provision is found in section 64-109,
Nebraska Revised Statutes:
If any person shall be damaged or injured by the unlawful
act, negligence or misconduct of any notary public in his official
capacity, the person damaged or injured may maintain a civil action
on the official bond of such notary public against such notary public,
and his sureties, and a recovery in such action shall not be a bar to
any future action for other causes to the full amount of the bond.
While this statute is obviously relevant to the present inquiry, it is
impossible to discern what its impact might be in an actual contro-
versy. No reported decision has ever interpreted the provision. It
is not inconceivable that the final phrase, "to the full amount of the
bond," might be interpreted as limiting the notary's civil liability
to $4,000.22 However, in an era when real property conveyances
(where defective acknowledgements most frequently result in
losses) only rarely involve so small a sum, there would seem to
be very strong public policy considerations in favor of adopting the
interpretation that the bond is only additional assurance that those
harmed by the notary's negligence will be compensated and is not,
of itself, the sole source of recovery.2 3 The interpretation ultimately
given to this statute is of fundamental and far reaching importance.
A misguided stroke of the judicial pen could easily prevent the
recovery of the damages actually suffered at the hands of a notary
whose act was wanton and recklessly negligent or even willfully
fraudulent.
It is perhaps precisely because of the importance which is at-
tached to an acknowledgement that courts have not appeared to
revert to their traditional conservatism in the process of defining
the limits of the class of persons to whom the notary owes a duty
of care. At least this is true in the sense of a "duty" sufficient to
22 $4,000 is the amount of the official bond required by NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 64-102 (Reissue 1966). However, this result seems improbable in
light of the general rule on the subject. "Procedural statutes should...[not] be construed to take away ... long-established and frequently
used remed[ies] unless they contain a clear and direct expression
of an intention to do so." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 395 (1953).
23 It has been held that, "The duty rests upon [the notary] regardless
of the bond. The liability of the notary arises out of a breach of official
duty and not out of the bond." Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Gulf Coast
Investment Corp., 410 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App., 1967).
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impose tort liability on the notary for his negligence. Individuals
far beyond the immediate parties to a particular instrument are
frequently held to be included among those who the notary could
have reasonably foreseen would be harmed by his false or fraudu-
lent action. Basically, the theory seems to be that once the impro-
perly acknowledged instrument is executed and delivered into the
hands of someone other than the notary, the notary should expect
that all subsequent holders will rely on the validity of his act.
24
Thus his negligent or fraudulent act may result in personal liability
for whatever injury results when the defective acknowledgement is
eventually discovered.25
24 This position is forcefully stated in American Surety Co. v. Boden,
243 Ky. 805, 50 S.W.2d 10 (Ct. App. 1932): "The duty of a notary
public in acting officially is not confined to the one to whom he directly
renders service. His duty is to the public and those who may be affected
by his act. The public has the right to rely upon the verity of a
certificate, and, if one sustains injury as the proximate [result] of a
willful violation of his official duty with respect to that certificate,
the officer becomes liable to him.... (citations omitted)
Where an officer, by wanton misconduct, starts on its way in the
commercial world a false certificate upon which the public has the
right to rely, he ought to be held responsible for all proximate con-
sequences, not only to the person who takes immediately and directly
under the instrument bearing the certificate, but to every one damaged
as the proximate result of it." This language has recently been quoted
as controlling authority in the case of Butler v. Olshan, 280 Ala. 181,
191 So.2d 7 (1966).
Justice Francis, dissenting from the supreme court's resolution in
Commercial Union, also incorporates the Kentucky ruling into his
opinion but elaborates on its ramifications as applied to that case.
"The bank knew the notary's certificate affixed to the document as
representation of verity which would accompany it into the channels
of business, on which a member of the public could rely in entering
into the transaction the instrument was designed to accomplish....
The presence of a notary's certificate justified belief that the docu-
ment was bona ftde." 49 N.J. 389, 398-99, 230 A.2d 498, 502-03 (1967).
(dissenting opinion).
Although Mr. Justice Cardozo would no doubt have shuddered at
this position because it is such a blatant "assault upon the citadel of
privity...." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E.
441, 445 (1931), the logic of the assertion is certainly compelling. This
carefully balanced blend of conventional notions of duty with public
policy demands would appear to present a virtually unassailable solu-
tion to a wide variety of questions concerning notarial liability.
25 An excellent example of the longevity which courts have attached
to a notary's faulty acknowledgement is found in a rather complex
Ohio case involving a car title used as collateral for a loan. An indi-
vidual forged the owner's name to an application for a certified copy
of the title and also to an assignment of the title to himself. Both the
application and the assignment were notarized, although by different
notaries, and the county clerk failed to mark the fraudulent title as
being a duplicate. In allowing the bank to recover its loss on the
COMMENTS
The Nebraska Supreme Court has refused to find an intervening
cause effective to terminate the notary's liability where plaintiff's
grantor inserted his own name as the grantee of a deed which the
notary had acknowledged while incomplete and which was neither
signed, completed, nor acknowledged in the presence of the original
title holder. Instead, the court held that:
[3t cannot be successfully urged that the loss would have arisen
without proper regard to the notary's act.... [a] third party relying
upon the certificate of the notary and the apparently regular execu-
tion, acknowledgement and delivery of the deed may assume the
authority of the holder of the deed to insert her name as grantee.26
It would appear that the manner in which notaries most fre-
quently violate their responsibilities is to acknowledge the execu-
tion of a document when in fact the supposed signatory of that docu-
ment has not personally appeared before them .27 That such a prac-
tice is clearly in violation of the express wording of most acknowl-
edgements 28 as well as the explicit statutory duty of the notary 29
can not be doubted. The Nebraska Supreme Court has denounced
this wanton disregard of official duty as "highly culpable" and as-
serted that, "It should be and is denounced by all authority, honesty
and reason. 830
invalid title, the court stated: "The cause of the plaintiffs loss was
the sequential and wrongful acts of each notary, the clerk and Nottke.
Without any one of them, the loss would not have occurred. While
the respective acts of the notaries and the clerk were not joint or
done in the execution of any agreement or conspiracy between any
two of them... each act did combine and coalesce with the others
and thus link a continuous chain of events which produced the result
and, together with Nottke's fraudulent conduct, constituted the proxi-
mate cause of the bank's loss, which would not have occurred but for
each independent act .... The wrongful acts of the notaries, being thus
conjoined and related, were material parts of the proximate cause
of the damage and, being so, the actors were, in the sense of liability,joint tort-feasors and are liable to the plaintiff." Erie County United
Bank v. Berk, 73 Ohio App. 314, 317-18, 56 N.E.2d 285, 287 (1943).
See also Commonwealth v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany, 364 Pa. 543, 73 A.2d 422 (1950); Miller v. Doak, 352 Pa. 380,
42 A.2d 826 (1945).
28 Harrington v. Vogle, 103 Neb. 677, 681, 173 N.W. 699, 700 (1919).
27 Miller v. Doak, 352 Pa. 380, 42 A.2d 826 (1945); Lowe v. Robin, 203
Tenn. 105, 310 S.W.2d 161 (1958); Nebraska State Bar Association v.
Butterfield, 169 Neb. 119, 98 N.W.2d 714 (1959).
28 11.. [B]efore me ... personally came ,.. personally to me
known to be the identical person whose name is affixed...." 1 L.
LIGTNmm, NEBRASKA Fomws ANNOTATED, § 82 et. seq. (rev. ed. 1951).
29 "Over his signature and official seal he shall certify the performance
of such duties so exercised and performed under the provisions of this
section...." (emphasis added). NEB. REv. STAT. § 64-107 (Reissue 1966).
80 In re Watson, 83 Neb. 211, 119 N.W. 451 (1909).
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Both the statutory condition precedent to appointment3 ' as well
as the oath required in the application 32 for a notarial commission
are phrased in very general and indefinite terms. Thus, beyond the
very obvious breach just discussed, it is not surprising that the
standard of care required of the notary is expressed in the familiar
tort terminology of "reasonableness.."33 In addition to certifying the
performance of acts which he has not in fact seen performed, a num-
ber of actions against the notary have resulted from the notary's
certification of acts as voluntary which he personally knows were
involuntary.34 A third group of decisions makes it apparent that the
notary has some obligation to ascertain the true identity of persons
appearing before him with whom he is not personally acquainted.3 5
Generally speaking, civil liability can attach to any notary public
who, at the very minimum, fails to actually fulfill the express word-
ing of the attestation clauses to which he affixes his official seal.
Unfortunately, none of the courts considering Commercial Union
felt compelled to apply these principles to the question of whether
Kuiphoff was in fact negligent in the performance of his duties as
a notary. However, in light of the foregoing discussion, it would ap-
-31 "No appointment shall be made until such applicant shall... certify
to the Governor under oath that he or she.., will, if commissioned,
faithfully discharge the duties pertaining to said office. ... " NEB. REV.
STAT. § 64-101(6) (Reissue 1966).
32 " do solemnly swear (or affirm) that... [I] will if
commissioned faithfully and impartially discharge and perform the
duties of the office of a general notary public, so help me God." Initial
Application For General Notary Public, Approved and Prescribed by
the Secretary of State, State of Nebraska.
33 "[NJegligence on the part of an officer consists only in a failure to
use that degree of care which an ordinary reasonable and prudent
man would exercise under the same or similar circumstances and con-
ditions. A reasonable effort to perform the duties pertaining to such
office is all the law requires." City of St. Louis v. Priest, 348 Mo. 37,
45, 152 S.W.2d 109, 112 (1941).
34 Nelson v. Hammett, 240 Mo. App. 307, 203 S.W.2d 115 (Kan. City App.
1947).
35 "It will be seen that the officer must (1) either know the person
to be the one described in the instrument, or, if he does not know him,
(2) he must have satisfactory evidence that the person desiring to
acknowledge the instrument is the one described in it and the one
who executed it." SKINNER, supra note 16, at 169. See also Com-
ment, The Notary Public, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 388, 393 (1964): "Some
jurisdictions ... follow the view that if the acknowledging party is
introduced to the notary by a credible person, the notary is not negli-
gent in assuming that a person is the one whom he purports to be."
For cases on this point see, Lowe v. Robin, 203 Tenn. 105, 310 S.W.2d
161 (1958); Erie County United Bank v. Berk, 73 Ohio App. 314, 56
N.E.2d 285 (1943).
COIVEIENTS
pear that his apparent lack of personal acquaintance with William
Aitken, together with the lack of evidence to establish any attempt
to ascertain who had in fact signed the general indemnity agree-
ment, would be more than sufficient to render him negligent in a
great majority of jurisdictions.
Is THE NOTARY PUBLIC A MINISTERIAL OR A
QUASI-JUDICIAL PUBLIC OFFICER?
Had Kuiphoff erroneously refused to honor a properly executed
bank draft, or failed to credit a deposit to a customer's account, or
even dropped a sack of quarters on the foot of an unsuspecting by-
stander, the bank would be hard pressed to avoid compensating the
party injured. 6 Yet even assuming that Kuiphoff was negligent and
that the negligent act caused the injury complained of by Com-
mercial Union, the liability of his employer remains in doubt. The
sole source of this remaining question of the bank's liability is the
plethora of doctrines shrouding the concept of "public official" and
the legal relationships in which such individuals may become
entangled.
Throughout each of the three reported decisions in this case,
there are abundant references to the question of whether Kuiphoff
was a "public official." The trial court noted that, "Plaintiff contends
that Kuiphoff was an agent of the bank in performing his duty in
taking the acknowledgement. '37 And, later in the opinion, "Defend-
ant bank contends that it cannot be liable for either the negligence
or misconduct of a notary public. A notary public is a public
officer. ' 38 Ultimately, the trial judge classified the acknowledge-
ment as, ". . not a bank function, but an act of a public official in
his individual capacity,"39 and to a great extent founded his deci-
sion upon that classification.
The appellate division recognized that, "The trial court awarded
summary judgment on the theory that there was no dispute of ma-
terial fact and that, legally, Kuiphoff was not performing an act
for the bank, but was instead acting in his official capacity as a
36 Supra, note 13; "Respondeat superior is the phrase used by the courts
to indicate the area within which a master is liable for the torts of
servants which, although committed disobediently, are connected with
the service of the employer. This is a condition imposed by the com-
mon law in return for the privilege of utilizing the services of others
in household and business matters." W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF T=E LAw
OF AGENCY § 83 (1964).
37 87 N.J. Super. 287, 289, 209 A.2d 155, 156 (1965).
38 Id. at 289, 209 A.2d at 157.
39 Id. at 290, 209 A.2d at 157.
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notary public."' 4 0 However, they refused to further consider the
problem and dealt instead with the doctrine that "scope of employ-
ment" is a question for the jury. The supreme court only heightened
the mystery concerning the New Jersey position on this issue by
stating that, "The notary holds a public office ... which the bank
itself could not hold....-41
As will be seen, underlying this confusion are the opposing no-
tions of "ministerial officer" and "quasi-judicial officer" and the
question of which of these two characterizations can accurately be
applied to the notary public in this factual context. At the outset
it will be extremely helpful to slightly alter the focal point implicit
in each of the three opinions. That is, while the courts refer to the
"position" or "function" of the notary, a discussion of the basic
nature and ramifications of a single particular act is a far more
fruitful ground for logical and understandable analysis. Such a shift
in emphasis is necessitated by the simple fact that the vast majority
of "public officials" perform acts of both types. Thus a single indi-
vidual is in the performance of some acts a "ministerial officer, but
in the performance of other acts, he is a "quasi-judicial officer."
A forceful rationale for the adoption of such an approach appeared
in State v. Loechner.42
There is scarcely a ministerial officer but that in the performance
of some act required to be done exercises a discretion quasi-judicial
in its nature, and regarding which the act itself can not rightfully
be classed as ministerial.... If ministerial officers can perform noth-
ing but ministerial acts, then it is hard to conceive of such officer,[sic] for some of the acts of every ministerial officer must require
the exercise of judgment and discretion, which is the very anti-
thesis of a ministerial act.43
Now, if the respective definitions of "ministerial" and "quasi-judi-
cial" acts are examined, it will finally become possible to perceive
the epicenter of the Commercial Union problem and scrutinize how
it is treated by each of these courts.
40 91 N.J. Super. 13, 15, 218 A.2d 892, 893 (1966).
41 49 N.J. 389, 392, 230 A.2d 498, 499 (1967) (citations omitted).
42 65 Neb. 814, 91 N.W. 874, (1902).
43 Id. at 820, 91 N.W. at 876; af'd, School Dist. v. Ellis, 163 Neb. 86, 77
N.W.2d 809 (1956). "The focal point of our inquiry is not, therefore,
whether Yarbrough was an independent contractor in the matter of
the handling of Sinclair products within the territory ... but whether
or not in the loading of a tank that was never used nor intended to
be used, by Yarbrough or any of his agents... and in the absence of
any express requirement of such contract for Yarbrough to make such
loading and shipment, Yarbrough was acting as an independent con-
tractor." Helms v. Sinclair Refining Co., 170 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir.
1948).
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Although Mechem's widely accepted and often quoted treatise on
the subject exhibits utmost caution in attempting to offer such defi-
nitions,4  it does state that an act is ministerial, ".... when the law...
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion of its perform-
ance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or dis-
cretion. Official action, the result of performing a certain specific
duty arising from designated facts is a ministerial act."' 45 A very
slightly modified version of this definition has been adopted by the
Nebraska Supreme Court.46 Finally, it seems generally recognized
that an officer is liable for his failure to properly perform ministerial
acts.47
Quasi-judicial acts, on the other hand, have been defined as,
... those which lie midway between the judicial and ministerial
ones. The lines separating them are necessarily indistinct; but, in
general terms, when the law, in words or by implication, commits to
any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not
in a way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion in its
nature judicial, the function is termed quasi-judicial."48 As to the
officer's liability for the wrongful performance of such functions, the
same author states, "The same reasons of public policy which operate
to render the judicial officer exempt from civil liability for his ju-
dicial acts... apply to the quasi-judicial officer as well, and it is well
settled that the quasi-judicial officer cannot be called upon to respond
in damages to the private individual for the honest exercise of his
judgment... however erroneous or misguided his judgment may
44 "The difficulty of dealing with questions of liability for judicial or
ministerial action... [lies] in determining whether the given act shall
be considered as judicial or ministerial in its character .... No inflex-
ible rule can be laid down by which this difficulty can be solved in
every case. Each case must be determined upon an examination of
all its facts. Here, too, as in other cases already considered, it is the
nature of the duty and not the title of the officer which determines
the liability." F. MECHEM, A TEAnSE ON Tnu LAw or PuBLic OrFcEs
m OmcERs, § 657 (1890) [hereinafter cited as MECHEm].
45 Id.
46 Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W.2d 189 (1944); accord, School
Dist. v. Ellis, 163 Neb. 86, 77 N.W.2d 809 (1956).
47 "[I]t is equally well settled that where the law imposes upon a public
officer the performance of ministerial duties in which a private indi-
vidual has a special and direct interest, the officer will be liable to
such individual for any injury which he may proximately sustain in
consequence of the failure or neglect of the officer either to perform
the duty at all, or to perform it properly." MEcH--, supra note 44,
at § 664.
48 Mzcm, supra note 44, at § 637.
49 MEcHmE, supra note 44, at § 638.
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be."49 The Nebraska Supreme Court has unequivocally adopted this
definition and rationale in absolving county commissioners" and
county treasurers5 ' from personal liability for their "official" acts
which were, at best, unreasonable.
Thus it can be seen that in theory, Commercial Union was con-
tending that Kuiphoff's acknowledgement of the indemnity agree-
ment was a ministerial act and therefore the notary (and under
respondent superior, his employer) would be liable for damages
caused by his negligent performance of that act. The bank predi-
cated their freedom from liability upon the assertion that the
cashier, when acting as a notary public, exercised a "discretion
in its nature judicial" and fell within the shroud of absolute im-
munity. They contended that because he was a notary public,
and notaries public are quasi-judicial public officials regardless
of the nature of the act being performed, Kuiphoff was, by
definition, incapable of incurring liability for the performance
of his "official act." Therefore, as his employer, they too would
be free from liability. Likewise, when the first court stated
that the assistant cashier was "acting in his official capacity as a
notary," it implicitly accepted the thesis that he was exercising the
discretion which elevates an "officer" to quasi-judicial status. The
second court, on the other hand, implied acceptance of the minis-
terial characterization asserted by Commercial Union by focusing
its attention on the scope of employment issue-a question which is
obviously irrelevant if Kuiphoff himself were not liable. The fre-
quent references of the supreme court to "official capacity" and
"official function" indicate that they too were strongly influenced
by considerations of "quasi-judicial" and "ministerial" functions.
Since they affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition as to the
bank, it is reasonable to assume that the supreme court charac-
terized the acknowledgement as a quasi-judicial act.
In attempting to correctly apply these definitions to the precise
situation involved in Commercial Union, it is of absolutely critical
importance to note a qualification which has been engrafted upon
the definition of "ministerial officers." This expanded definition
appears in the very informative case of Larson v. Marsh.52 "The fact
'that a necessity may exist for the ascertainment, from personal
knowledge, or from information derived from other sources, of
those facts or conditions upon the existence or fulfillment of which,
50 Harmer v. Petersen, 151 Neb. 412, 37 N.W.2d 511 (1949); Allen v.
Miller, 142 Neb. 469, 6 N.W.2d 594 (1942).
51 School Dist. v. Ellis, 163 Neb. 86, 77 N.W.2d 809 (1956).
-2 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W.2d 189 (1944).
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the performance of the act becomes a clear and specific duty, does
not operate to convert the act into one judicial in its nature.' ",5
That is, the duty of determining what the facts of a particular situa-
tion are does not require a quasi-judicial type of discretion. This
distinction between discretion to refuse to act in a prescribed man-
ner until after determining that appropriate facts are present and
discretion to act in any manner the officer chooses after ascertaining
whatever facts he deems relevant was expressly followed in School
District v. Ellis,54 a 1956 decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Since the only "discretion" vested in the notary is to determine
whether or not the person appearing before him is the individual
designated in the instrument there would appear to be little doubt
that at least in Nebraska, and probably generally, Kuiphoff's notari-
zation of the indemnity agreement was in fact a ministerial act.
One final point must be made. Because a notary acts almost
exclusively only upon the request of another individual, the con-
clusion is virtually inescapable that the requesting party has a very
particular or "special" interest in the "official" act being performed.
That is, unless an individual hopes to secure for himself some ad-
vantage or benefit by virtue of an acknowledgement, the notary will
not be called upon to exercise his power. In the case of Larson v.
Marsh, the court enunciated the following position:
The rule is aptly stated by an authoritative text writer as fol-
lows: 'So it is immaterial that the duty is one primarily imposed
upon public grounds and therefore a duty owing primarily to the
public, if, notwithstanding, the individual has in it a distinctive
and direct interest and the legal right to require its performance;
the right of action springs from the fact that the private individual
receives a special and peculiar injury from the neglect in perform-
ance against which it was in part the purpose of the law to protect
him.' Mechem, Public Officers, 448. We think the correct rule is
that where a statute imposes on a public officer the performance
of ministerial duties in which a private individual has a special and
direct interest, the officer will become liable to such individual for
damages which he may proximately sustain in consequence of the
failure or neglect of such officer to perform the duty or to perform
it properly.55
53 Id. at 648, 14 N.W.2d at 191.
54 163 Neb. 86, 77 N.W.2d 809 (1956).
55 Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 648-49, 14 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1944). See
also MEcHmE, supra note 44, at § 664. 'Where, however, the law imposes
on the officer the performance of ministerial duties in which a private
individual has a special, direct, or distinctive interest, the officer is
liable to such individual for any injury which he may proximately
sustain in consequences of the failure to perform the duty at all, or to
perform it properly." 67 C.J.S. Officers § 127(b).
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Had the New Jersey courts unearthed the "special interest" doc-
trine quoted above, their inability to correctly define Kuiphoff's act
as ministerial would have been abrogated because all concerned
would have been released from the haunting spectre of "public
official" which runs throughout the opinions. With the application
of this doctrine, the smoke screen raised by Prospect Park, (ap-
parently effective in obstructing the view of the other participants
in this litigation), would have been cleared away and due con-
sideration given to the question of Kuiphoff's employment and
respondeat superior.
POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE EMTPLOYER'S LIABILrTY
Once it is determined that Kuiphoff would be personally liable
for his negligent performance of a ministerial act (i.e., affixing his
notarial seal when the indemnity agreement was neither signed in
his presence nor by persons "known to him"), it is possible to focus
attention on the liability of his employer. The appellate division's
acceptance of the rspondeat superior doctrine relied upon in Com-
mercial Union was based upon a finding that Kuiphoff's notarial
services were actuated in part by a purpose to improve the bank's
customer relations. Certainly the court's observation that improving
customer relations was part of the bank's "business"516 is highly
logical and undoubtedly accurate. The proposition is irrefutable
that retaining one's customers in a competitive marketing arena is
essential for mere survival, let alone for growth and prosperity.
Conduct thus motivated solely by the necessities of the marketplace
could hardly be classified as anything but a business activity.
However, earlier in their opinion, this second court had moved
considerably closer to what in fact is the true issue in regard to
Kuiphoff's agency capacity when they stated:
While it is true [because of a stipulation by counsel] that the
bank was not interested in the transaction covered by the indem-
nity agreement, and consequently that the acknowledgement thereof
was not a "bank transaction," this fact alone is not dispositive of
the issue herein. Rather, the question to be resolved is whether
56 "Here, plaintiff seeks to hold the bank... solely because the bank
sought to improve its relations with its own customers .... In this
modern world of competitive banking, the efforts of a bank to improve
its relations with its customers would be as much a part of the busi-
ness of a bank as would be the performance of a 'bank transaction.'"
91 N.J. Super. 13, 17, 218 A.2d 892, 894 (1966). "The Appellate Division
held that upon a finding, which the evidence would permit, that the
assistant cashier was actuated in part by a purpose to improve cus-
tomer relations, the bank could be charged as employer with his
neglect...." 49 N.J. 389, 391, 230 A.2d 498, 499 (1967).
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the alleged negligence of Kuiphoff was committed by him while
he was acting in the scope of his employment.57
This excerpt illustrates what the entire opinion of the appellate
division clearly assumes-that at the time of the "alleged negli-
gence" Kuiphoff was in fact an employee of the bank indistinguish-
able from any other assistant cashier. The supreme court deftly
avoids the issue of the bank's connection or relationship with Kuip-
hoff in regard to the faulty acknowledgement. Instead they state,
"Here, plaintiff seeks to hold the bank, not on the thesis that the
bank was a party in interest in a contract with plaintiff, but solely
because the bank sought to improve its relations with its own cus-
omers .... ,,59 Thus it appears that when the supreme court rules,
"We see no good reason to hold a private employer who was in no
sense a party in interest in the transaction when the claimant did
not look to the employer. .. ,"59 they are doing little, if anything,
more than saying that at the time the negligent act was committed
by Kuiphoff, the relationship of employer-employee did not exist
between the bank and the notary. Somehow, the proverbial "cart"
was given priority over what is the crucial inquiry in this factual
context. That is, the "scope of employment" question is given sub-
stantially more attention than is the basic relationship of the parties
involved in regard to the act performed. If Kuiphoff was not an
employee of the bank in the taking of this acknowledgement, the
entire question of "scope of employment" does not arise. Thus, at
this point, the real issue is whether Kuiphoff qua notary was an
employee of the bank or merely an independent contractor hired
by the bank and directed to improve its customer relations by exer-
cising his official powers.
The logical observation that a single individual may be an em-
ployee in respect to one act and an independent contractor with
respect to another act, is certainly not unknown to the law.60 An
excellent explanation of the concept is found in Helms v. Sinclair
Refining Co.61 The case involves a suit by the driver of a gasoline
transport against a refining company. The defendant company con-
tended that its distributor, under whose supervision the plaintiff
was employed, was an independent contractor and that it was there-
fore insulated from liability. In support of this position, the defend-
ant was able to rely on an impressive array of previous litigation
involving identical distributor contracts which had firmly estab-
57 91 N.J. Super. 13, 16, 218 A.2d 892, 893 (1966).
58 49 N.J. 389, 392, 230 A.2d 498, 500 (1967).
59 Id. at 395, 230 A.2d at 501.
00 Marcum v. United States, 208 F.Supp. 929 (W.D. Ky. 1962); see also
cases collected at 2 Am. Ji . Agency § 8 (1954).
61 170 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1948).
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lished that in relation to the subject matter of the contract, the dis-
tributor was in fact an independent contractor. However, the court
held the defendant to be liable under the dual capacity doctrine
based upon the following reasoning:
We are aware of the fact that generally the existence ef the
relationship of independent contractor and employer excludes the
relationship between the parties of principal and agent or master
and servant. Nevertheless, there is not necessarily such repug-
nance between them that both relationships could not exist at the
same time in connection with different phases of the work. An
employee might be an independent contractor as to certain work
and a mere servant as to other work not embraced within the
independent contract.62
In Commercial Union, apparently the bank, (and the supreme
court), regarded Kuiphoff's notarization as the act of an independ-
ent contractor while plaintiff and implicitly the appellate division
considered it to be a function of the bank's employee. Thus it is
imperative that the distinction between these two relationships be
examined.
The Restatement of Agency states that, "A servant is an agent
employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose phys-
ical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is
subject to the right to control by the master."63 On the other hand,
"An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. 64 It is certainly
not surprising that the reporter for this section of the American
Law Institute adopts the same high degree of emphasis on the con-
cept of control in his treatise.6 5 In discussing the liability of masters
for the torts of their servants, and particularly discussing the defini-
tion of a servant, Professor Seavey notes that:
The right to control the physical movements of the employee is
the most important single element in most of the situations. This
does not mean de facto control, which is usually absent, but the
right to control. This may be described as the element responsive
to the tort principle that control creates responsibility.66
The Nebraska court has adopted this position almost verbatim.
In Gardner v. Kothe67 they reaffirmed and followed earlier rulings
that:
62 Id. at 291.
63 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1957).
65 W. SEAvEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (1964).
66 Id. at § 84(c).
67 172 Neb. 364, 109 N.W.2d 405 (1961).
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The primary test in determining whether the relationship of
employer-employee exists is whether the alleged employer has the
right of control.., and the right to direct the manner in which
the work is to be done. ... Generally most courts agree that the
main test is the right of control, and that right governs.... Other
factors are looked to only to aid in determining whether such rela-
tionship existed in a given case.68
The Nebraska definition of independent contractor is also very
close to the Restatement position. "An independent contractor is
generally distinguished from an employee as being a workman who
contracts to do a particular piece of work according to his own
method, and is not subject to the control of his employer, except
as to the results of the work."69
Even though the rules of law governing this distinction are
quite firmly established, the particular factual content of Com-
mercial Union does not admit to an easy application of these prin-
ciples.70 With respect to notaries, there is in reality very little
activity to be controlled. That is, as has been established, the proper
execution of a notarial acknowledgement involves the exercise of
very little, if any discretion by the notary. When an individual ap-
pears before a notary, presents identification sufficient to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the notary that he is the person
named in the instrument, and under sworn oath fulfills the terms of
the instrument or acknowledgement by stating a particular fact or
doing the prescribed act, notarization follows. 71 The Legislature,
(and the court to the extent of defining the standard of care neces-
sary), has created a process from which nearly any material devia-
tion is prohibited. The process is set in motion by the individual
desiring an acknowledgement to be made and completed by the
notary. But it is difficult to perceive the opportunity for the actual
68 Id. at 366, 109 N.W.2d at 406.
69 Snodgrass v. City of Holdrege, 166 Neb. 329, 332, 89 N.W.2d 66, 68
(1957), aff'd, Pearson v. Schuler 172 Neb. 353, 109 N.W.2d 537 (1961).
70 For a further discussion of the crucial nature of the "right to control,"
see Conant, Liability of Principals for Torts of Agents: A Comparative
View, 47 NEB. L. REv. 42 (1968). Footnotes 16 and 17 of that article
are of particular interest in regard to determining whether or not
the "right to control" sufficient to distinguish a servant from an inde-
pendent contractor would be present in this case.
71 The right of an individual to insist that the notary make an acknowl-
edgement in such circumstances is apparently quite firm. "The rule
seems to be that where a public officer has been clothed by statute with
power to do an act which concerns the public interest or the rights
of third persons, the execution of the power may be insisted on as a
duty, although the wording of the statute is permissive merely and
not peremptory." Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 647, 14 N.W.2d 189,
191 (1944).
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exercise of "control" over this process or even the existence of the
"right to control" on the part of either the notary or his employer.
Only the individual seeking an acknowledgement, who is free to
to choose whether or not to obtain notarial services and if so, what
notary to approach, can realistically be said to exercise any "con-
trol" over the entire process of notarization.
Notwithstanding this dilemma, Commercial Union could have
presented its position in a more favorable context by discussing the
realities of Kuiphoff's employment with the bank. As was men-
tioned earlier, had he dropped a bag of quarters on the foot of a
customer, the liability of the bank for the customer's injuries would
be virtually beyond question. Yet, short of wholly uneconomical
and unreasonably interfering safety measures, the bank was help-
less to assert any "control" over such an occurrence. On the other
hand, it seems highly unlikely that any employee-notary would
acknowledge an instrument (or carry quarters) in the face of an
absolute prohibition of such acts by his employer. In this same vein,
if the president of the defendant bank had handed the general
indemnity agreement, complete with signatures, to Kuiphoff and
requested that he notarize it, it is unreasonable to believe that the
notary would have refused and not improbable to assume that he
would not have hesitated for more than a moment.7 2 Thus, in a
purely realistic light, the bank did in fact retain the requisite "right
of control" which forms the basis for liability under respondeat
superior in that it could have prevented the taking of acknowl-
edgements by bank employees. Although the bank's contention
that it could not "control" the "official act" of a notary public has
some theoretical appeal in light of the concepts discussed in the
preceding paragraph, it should not be "dispositive of the issue."
Rather, emphasis and focus on the simple fact that the bank could
have prevented the taking of acknowledgements by its employees
72 '"Dear Ann Landers: I am a stenographer employed by a firm of
lawyers. Several months ago, the firm paid the expenses involved in
my becoming a notary public. Every one of my employers has, at one
time or another, asked me to notarize signatures which were affixed to
documents when I was not present. This always bothers me but I have
been told 'It's not important. It's only a technicality....' I alone am
answerable and I am becoming extremely uncomfortable about these
occurrences. Any suggestions? Indianapolis.
Dear In: Tell your bosses that from now on you refuse to notarize
a document unless you are present at the signing. You may be canned
but a girl with such sterling character should have no trouble getting
another job if her ability matches her integrity." A. Landers, Ann
Landers .... Answers Personal Problems, The Lincoln Journal (Ne-
braska), March 15, 1968, at 14, col. 4. (Copyright, Publishers-Hall
Syndicate).
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could easily establish Kuiphoff as an employee of the bank in the
taking of the acknowledgement. 8
Even if the difficult question of liability under respondeat super-
ior is resolved against the plaintiff by virtue of a finding that the
bank did not have the right of control, and therefore, when taking
acknowledgements Kuiphoff was an independent contractor em-
ployed by the bank to improve its customer relations, there are at
least two other legal theories which might be urged in an attempt
to impose liability on the bank. However, unlike respondeat super-
ior, they are based upon the notion of "fault" or negligent conduct
on the part of the bank itself rather than on the part of Kuiphoff.
The New Jersey court mentions the possibility of both "negligent
supervision" and "intentional misrepresentation" as a basis for
allowing the plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint.
An interesting discussion of the "negligent supervision" theory
is found in DeVille v. Shell Oil Co.74 Citing substantial authority,
which is here omitted, the court makes the following comment:
Alaska follows the general rule that the employer of an inde-
pendent contractor is not responsible for the negligence of the con-
tractor .... However, there are some well recognized exceptions
to this rule, including the exception here pertinent that if the em-
ployer retains supervision or control over the work of the inde-
pendent contractor the employer will be responsible for harm
resulting from its own negligent supervision or controL7 5
Obviously, the application of this principle again turns on the pres-
ence or absence of a type of "control" and, as has been shown, this
is indeed a complex question in the Commercial Union type of
situation. However, in determining whether the requisite "control"
is present to hold the employer for negligently supervising his
employee, a standard is utilized which is somewhat different from
that which distinguishes between employees and independent con-
tractors. That is, a particular factual situation may include sufficient
73 Had the New Jersey courts escaped the nemises of 'public officer"
notions, and, accepted the analysis herein proposed, the assertion of
the appellate division and the dissenting justice of the supreme court
that the case was properly for determination by the jury probably
would have prevailed. "Whether the act was done within the scope of
employment is a question of fact .... Each case must be determined
with a view to the surrounding facts and circumstances, the char-
acter of the employment and the nature of the wrongful act. Whether
the act was or was not such as to be within the scope of employment
is, ordinarily, one of fact for the determination of the jury." Stone
v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44, 29 Am. Rep. 635 (1877). Adopted in Nebraska,
Watts v. Zadina, 179 Neb. 548, 552, 139 N.W.2d 290, 292 (1966).
74 366 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1966).
75 Id. at 125.
524 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 2 (1969)
''control" to make the employer liable for his own negligence in
failing to properly supervise the employee while not enough "con-
trol" is present to transfer the employee from the status of inde-
pendent contractor to servant and thereby give rise to liability of
the employer on a respondeat superior theory.
The test approved and employed in DeVille originated in an
earlier decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit: "It is apparent that where the employer has retained some
element of control of the job, he should be responsible for the harm-
ful consequences of its performance as a concomitant of the control
retained. ' 76 It is in this context that the plaintiff's argument that the
bank certainly could have prevented the acknowledgement from
ever occurring has its greatest impact.T 7 Finally, it should be noted
that this doctrine has been expressly applied to innumerable cases
involving the failure of a notary, as agent or employee of a bank, to
protest or present "commercial paper" the bank had received for
collection.7 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court expresses the rationale
for this application of the doctrine in the following terms:
[T]hose States which, like New Jersey, hold the bank, do so upon
the thesis that the notary's failure is with respect to a duty required
of the bank so that the notary failed, not as a public officer, but
as an employee or agent selected by the bank to perform the bank's
own obligation.7 9
76 Spinozzi v. E. J. Leviono and Co., 243 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1957).
77 "Again, one is guilty of negligence in failing to give instructions
needed to prevent harm in the execution of work by an independent
contractor.... " (citations omitted). W. SEAvY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF AGENCY § 82(b) (1964).
78 Although there is a substantial amount of authority on this point, it
has been intentionally avoided for several reasons. The collection of
promissory notes, bills, or bonds turned over to a bank by one of its
customers is undeniably a "bank transaction" and thus is far removed
from the more interesting, and infinitely more frequently occurring
situation in which the employer directs the notary-employee to make
an acknowledgement that is not so directly or inextricably bound up
in the employer's "business." Secondly these cases have arisen from
a negligent act of the notary other than the failure to identify the
party, administer the oath or witness the signature. That is, they
usually involve a notary who has incorrectly addressed the notice of
protest or simply forgotten to send it. For a further discussion of this
area, see SKINNER, supra note 16, at § 299 et. seq. See also, Williams v.
Parks, 63 Neb. 747, 89 N.W. 395 (1902) and cases cited in the annota-
tion to NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-107 (Reissue 1966).
79 49 N.J. 389, 393, 230 A.2d 498, 500 (1967). It is interesting to note that
while the New Jersey court could recognize the existence of the
master-servant relationship between a notary and the bank employ-
ing him in this context, they failed to perceive, or at least discuss,
the identical problem in the case before them.
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Fraud, or at least negligent misrepresentation, is another plaus-
ible basis for imposing liability upon the bank. Only Kuiphoff's
refusal to testify as to whether or not an officer of the bank had re-
quested that he notarize the indemnity agreement, an unwarranted
refusal according to the dissenting supreme court justice,80 casts
doubt upon the efficacy of such theories. If it is assumed that one
of Aitken's co-defendants, perhaps an officer or stockholder of the
construction company, handed the signed agreement to a bank
officer and asked that he have it notarized, and that officer made a
similar "request" to Kuiphoff, then it may be said that Kuiphoff's
acknowledgement was the direct result of an express order or
direction from his employer. Such a situation would appear to be
within the rule first stated in Stone v. Hills.8 1
For all acts done by a servant in obedience to the express orders
or directions of the master... and for acts in any sense warranted
by the express or implied authority conferred upon him, considering
the nature of the services required, the instruction given, and the
circumstances under which the act is done, the master is respon-
sible.8 2
If the bank officer knew that defendant Aitken had not signed
the agreement or that his signature thereon was a forgery at the
time he requested Kuiphoff's services, the bank's liability would
be even more certain. In the words of Professor Seavey, "No ques-
tion of agency is involved where a principal knowingly tells his
agent to make misstatements ... the same liability follows if he
uses a third person [presumably this would include an independent
contractor] to achieve the fraud."8' 3 In fact, it is not unlikely that
the notary would be absolved from any liability on the theory that
he was not negligent in relying upon the identification or representa-
tion made to him by such a "credible person" as his employer.8 4
CONCIaJSION
Although much of the official activity of a notary public may
be routine, the office itself is ancient and essential to an orderly
society. The consequences of a notary's malfunctioning or ignor-
ance may be serious and even tragic. Without full knowledge of
his powers, obligations and limitations, a notary public may be a
positive danger to the community in which he is licensed to
act....85
80 49 N.J. at 397-98, 230 A.2d at 502 (dissenting opinion).
81 45 Conn. 44 j 29 Am. Rep. 635 (1877); Adopted in Defoe v. Grantski, 143
Neb. 344, 9 N.W.2d 488 (1943); accord, Niemeyer v. Forburger, 172 Neb.
876, 112 N.W.2d 276 (1961).
82 45 Conn. at 46, 29 Am. Rep. at 636.
83 W. SEAVEY, HAmDOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 82 (1964).
84 Comment: The Notary Public, 16 BAYLOR L. REv. 388, 393 (1964).
85 Desmond, Chief Judge of New York State, Forward to J. SKINNER,
SxINNEi's NOTORMS MANUAL at ii (3d ed. 1963).
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Our particularly commercial world has a definite need for impar-
tial witnesses to acknowledge the performance of certain acts. Yet
the great utility which the notary public might have in this context
is drastically diminished, if not eliminated, by practices which, ac-
cording to the reported cases, are slovenly and in flagrant violation
of the conditions of their appointment.
This situation can be remedied, and the necessity for accuracy
and veracity impressed upon those commissioned as notaries, by the
more frequent imposition of tort liability. The Nebraska statutes
and cases cited herein establish that recovery from both the notary
and his employer is certainly possible; the veil of "public official-
dom" behind which the notary may seek to conceal his misdeeds is
far too thin to afford protection. Tort claims are certainly a time-
honored method of reducing the incidence of frustrated expectations
and financial losses and there is no reason to believe that they would
not have this same impact in the realm of notaries public.
Initially a determination must be made as to whether or not
the notary has in fact been negligent. However, violation of the
express wording of an acknowledgement, or of the oath of office,
will generally be sufficient evidence to establish negligence. Yet this
is only a partial solution. If the abuses of the myriad of clerks,
bookkeepers and secretaries who are also notaries are to be more
effectively curbed, recovery must also be had from their employers.
There are of course some situations in which the employer would
be entitled to insulation from such claims. If he were wholly and
"reasonably" unaware that the employee was a notary, or that the
employee ever made acknowledgements during business hours,
there would appear to be no rational basis upon which to ground
liability. And, if the individual seeking the acknowledgement did
not transact any business whatsoever with the employer, and was
neither a present nor a prospective "customer" of the employer,
any "good will" or benefit which might inure to the employer as
the result of the employee's notarizations would seem too insignifi-
cant to serve as a basis for the imposition of liability. However, if
the employer requested the acknowledgement, or advertised that
notarial services were available at his business establishment, he
should be treated no differently than any other "master" so inatten-
tive as to employ incompetent "servants." In general, the employer
should be liable for the loss caused by the defective acknowledge-
ment of his employees whenever he has knowingly permitted an
employee to exercise notarial powers while within the scope of his
employment. Only in the rarest of circumstances will the gain or
advantage which is the touchstone of respondeat superior be absent.
J. Michael Gottschalk '69
